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Abstract 
 
Reflecting on the question of who is the principal subject of social
responsibility in the business sphere, Greenfield sets out a number of
common assumptions among practitioners in the field and tries to
dismantle them through a critical review of recent literature. Some of his
reflections need to be nuanced from an ethical basis and elaborated upon
from a practical point of view. Taking as our starting point Greenfield’s
conclusion  “there is no such thing as business ethics, only ethics of 
individual business men and women”, this article aims to look in more 
depth at the consequences of regulating personal ethics and referring it to
an institution. What will happen if we continue with the current approach
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INTRODUCTION: GREENFIELD´S ASSUMPTIONS 
 
This paper is a consequence of Greenfield’s stimulating article. Reading In the Name of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has stirred up some ideas from the depths.  The 
author defines three groups that defend CSR, but which start out from conceptually 
different positions. The first group believes that a company is a person with rights and 
duties. A second group considers the company to be an artificial legal invention that 
only has two responsibilities given to it by law: to generate profits for its owners and to 
obey the law. A third group tries to incorporate CSR into a broad vision of the 
company’s stakeholder groups, as a mechanism for enhancing its relationships with 
them. Regardless of the perspective adopted, for Greenfield, the way in which the term 
CSR is being used places a dangerous emphasis on the “irresponsibility” of business.  
For Greenfield, this arises out of the confusion caused by considering the company as a 
legal person. A legal person is a person, and therefore should be responsible. And as the 
opposite of responsible is irresponsible, companies that do not act in accordance with 
the principles of CSR must be acting irresponsibly. For his part, Greenfield concludes 
that the rules of the game have not changed. He therefore calls for a return to a more 
authentic interpretation of those rules. In his view, a practical measure would be to 
‘restrict the ability of NGOs and MNCs to form alliances that supersede governments in 
defining what is “good” for people.’ He suggests replacing this by (public) education so 
that individuals are able to discern for themselves what is genuine and what is mere 
propaganda. At all events, he says that ‘its our job as citizens to require reasonable 
analyses and good answers from those who purport to know what is right  or good for 
the rest of us.’ Finally, he concludes that responsibility is a burden that can only fall 
upon people, and that it is artificial to place the organisation above its members.  
 
Recent papers by Hemingway and Maclagan (2004), Angelidis and Ibrahim (2004), and 
Soares (2003) have focused particular emphasis on the question of responsibility (who 
is responsible for what) and have tried to clarify the boundaries of both business ethics 
and CSR. Is a corporation an entity in relation to which we can apply the ideas of moral 
responsibility such as agency, rationality and autonomy? We feel it is appropriate to go 
against the tendency to view the corporation as the agent. Individuals can, in fact, make 
a difference. 
 This is one of the points we will deal with at greater length in this article 
and on which we will base our discussion in order to take Greenfield’s reflections 
(2004) on the relationship between personal ethics and business responsibility further. 
 
But, what is CSR for us? Consistent with Greenfield’s view, and basing ourselves on 
Von Weltzien (2003), Freeman and Liedtka (1991), Hemphill (1997), Smith (2003), 
Mitchell, and Agle and Wood (1997), we understand CSR to be a set of practices a 
company may follow in order to improve its relationships with its stakeholders and to 
create value. Moreover, these practices go beyond the formal requirements normally 
regulating these relationships or any specific laws that may be in place. It therefore 
implies a set of voluntary actions, and a going beyond the company’s obligations to 
each of the members of its stakeholder group. As it emerges at the free initiative of the 
company it can be subject to ethical valuation and treated as a source of differentiation. 
If the company is forced to follow these practices by legal imperatives, they lose their 
effectiveness as a competitive tool. It is on this proposed understanding of CSR that we 
shall develop our reflections. 
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BROADENING GREENFIELD’S ASSUMPTIONS  
 
Greenfield makes an important contribution whose implications need to be nuanced and 
elaborated. We believe it is appropriate to look in more depth from an ethical 
perspective at the question of who responsible behaviour can be attributed to. We would 
also like to look in more depth at the roots of the socialisation of responsibility that CSR 
brings with it. 
 
Ethics of the business vs. Ethics of the business man or woman 
 
Why is CSR a good thing? Why should a company have to implement a corporate 
responsibility plan? Even assuming that CSR is the way to cure the ills of a sick 
company, it is being applied with a strange urgency, without sufficient tests, without 
determining the correct dosage –the approach would seem to be the more the better– 
and without determining if it is beneficial in all cases or if it has side effects. It is a 
pharmaceutical invented in the laboratory of commonplaces and tried on guinea pigs 
with a DNA sequence totally different from that which shapes the modern company. 
Could there be anything more dangerous?  
 
The symptoms are one thing; the causes another. Here we could follow the usual 
procedure for a medical diagnosis. That would mean agreeing what measuring 
instruments will best determine the symptoms the illness manifests; determining 
whether the symptoms are caused by an illness or an external agent; deciding what 
therapy to apply and how to apply it; and then specifying the dosage and the duration of 
the treatment. 
 
Unfortunately ethical ills are not cured by taking a prescription. The rationality involved 
in human decision-making is not scientific but prudential. Cortina (2000) starts from the 
position that ethics is a form of knowledge which enables us to act rationally, but that 
the rationality involved in ethical experience is not of the same sort as when one is 
aware of a goal and uses this knowledge to bring to bear suitable means to enable that 
goal to be attained. Ethical rationality is not instrumental. What is explicitly known in 
moral action is precisely the act that is going to be performed. Ethical knowledge is 
practical knowledge, a knowledge that accompanies and directs action, guiding the 
correct use of freedom. The rightness of our actions does not derive directly from their 
matching a set of universal norms in the way that putting up a building correctly 
depends on how closely the original plans are followed. The “good” person is not one 
who moulds his or her conduct so it is a faithful reflection of a universal law. Acting 
correctly is not defined by rules. The correctness or prudence of our actions cannot be 
learned from lessons or books. It is not a theoretical question, but a practical one. For 
this reason ethical knowledge can only be “known” by people who are prudent, who are 
at one with their values and who are able to hit upon the right solution in every case. 
 
Ethical precepts usually take the form of an imperative proposition regarding an act. But 
the act should be understood in terms of its human significance rather than its material 
aspects. To get the right approach it is essential to overcome the idea of morality as a set 
of propositionally formulated precepts to which people must submit their conduct in a 
way analogous to how legal rules determine conduct. Indeed, “legalism” is one of the 
greatest risks for the correct understanding of morality. If one considers the ultimate and 
definitive point of reference for morality to be precepts it is impossible to avoid the IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
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realisation that some precepts conflict with others, and that the lower ones must 
therefore give way to those above them. This implies a serious legalistic distortion. The 
question is to express moral values adequately, so that they can offer practical guidance 
to specific aspects of conduct. 
 
Business ethics is no different from human ethics. We should not draw a dividing line 
between individual morality and social morality. They are not different moralities. 
Rather social morality is the expression of individual morality, which is where its 
origins and foundations lie. All individual moral acts have social repercussions and all 
social acts individual ones. The divisions drawn between individual ethics and social 
ethics (of which business ethics is no more than a particularisation to which CSR makes 
a large contribution) are artificial. There is no positive human quality that does not have 
a beneficial social impact. At the same time there is no positive quality in a society that 
does not have its starting point in the individual qualities of its members. We therefore 
agree with Greenfield (2004) that “corporations have social responsibilities” is an 
empty statement and that the assertion “if corporations were to behave responsibly, 
corporate scandals would stop” is false. 
 
Friedman (1970) states that only individuals have responsibilities and that they have to 
assume them with their resources and their time. Executives have a duty to maximise 
profits, and to do so in a way that is legal and ethical. The company, as a tool or 
invention, cannot be subject to considerations of this kind. In the same way that we say 
a hammer is good or bad: it will be so to the extent that it meets the purpose for which it 
was created. Friedman states clearly that “the executive is a person. As such, he or she 
may have other responsibilities he or she has taken on voluntarily – a family, belonging 
to a church, a city, country (...) But in these matters he or she acts as a principal not an 
agent,”  as opposed to what he or she does in the company: work for someone else. He 
or she spends his or her time and energy as he or she sees fit, which is not the case when 
it’s the employer’s resources that are being consumed. In the historical context in which 
Friedman wrote his ideas, firms did not integrate their social actions with their business; 
it was felt that they distracted executives’ attention and diverted resources away from 
the firm’s main goal. It is logical to consider it a serious act of irresponsibility to devote 
oneself to activities other than purely productive ones, no matter how good they may be.  
 
Obsession for regulations 
 
As alluded to above, the spirit of CSR strongly defends the establishment of norms, 
standards, the sharing of experience and a long etcetera of bureaucratic processes that 
are said to be worthwhile because they lead firms towards a convergence of practices 
and approaches at the international level. The reality involves much more than codes 
and practices, so these necessarily end up as merely “good intentions”.  
 
For some people, individual ethical convictions lack social value. In society procedures 
are established to determine what the majority consider to be right. As Greenfield sums 
it up:  “we, as a society, know the socially responsible thing to do”. In other words, the 
“good” is what is social defined as such (a statement which leaves out the concept of 
human nature). This is what nowadays is called procedural ethics and may be assumed 
to be the only social ethics that does not infringe the freedom of the individual. The 
establishment of codes of ethics in the company is frequently based on mere procedural 




Before proceeding we should clarify the difference between ethical principles and codes 
of ethics. The former have to be discovered; the latter, formulated. When one is 
convinced that codes of ethics (whether personal or corporate) are the object of a 
decision by those who should abide by them one falls inevitably into relativism. From 
this point of view it would be sufficient to learn the code in order to find the good, 
forgetting that, in reality, virtue has to be acquired. Treviño and Brown (2004) argue 
that one of the myths that has to be exploded in order to understand the role of ethics in 
business is that “ethics can be managed through formal ethic codes and programs”. 
Likewise, in the view of Schermerhorn and Dienhart (2004), business ethics is more a 
matter of personal leadership than codes of conduct. 
 
We agree with Norman and MacDonald (2004) that “...the future of firms deciding 
voluntarily to report on their social performance will end up looking very much like the 
history of firms deciding to bind themselves to a corporate code of ethics. On the one 
hand, the mere fact that it has produced a social report or a code of ethics tells us very 
little about a firm’s actual commitment to the principles expressed in the documents (…) 
On the other hand, both types of documents can play a critical role in a firm´s serious 
strategy to improve its ethical and social performance and to integrate this goal into its 
corporate culture. It is our belief that clear and meaningful principles are most likely to 
serve firms of the latter type; and that vague and literally meaningless principles like 
those implied by the Triple Bottom Line are best only for facilitating hypocrisy”. 
Moreover, by demanding more justification from business people, there is an imminent 
danger of the “tribunalisation” of the economy.  This has its origins in a kind of 
“remoralisation” that is not ethical per se, but rather moral aggression, that is, a kind of 
aggression directed against entrepreneurs camouflaged as morality. However, when 
introducing moral issues into various fields, it is necessary to be aware of the risk of 
causing resentment.  
 
Given that we need to overcome our conscience every day, the ethical component of the 
economy should move between the turbulent waters of impertinent moralism and 
acritical defence; between abstract requirements and premature acceptance of what is. 
And there are two positions: the optimistic position holds that if people are doing what 
they like best, then we will be doing what is best for everyone. The pessimists argue 
that if people really do what they most want to do, they will do what harms other people 
most. In essence this boils down to the idea that spontaneous action is either 
constructive or destructive.  
 
Pessimists are afraid of freedom. So they need lots of rules to regulate society. 
Optimists tend towards anarchy. However, in reality, spontaneity is sometimes good, 
sometimes bad. The fundamental difference does not lie in spontaneity but in the 
ordering of the result, more specifically the product or fruit that transcends the activity 
performed. We play for the sake of playing, but we work to produce. It would not come 
amiss here to return to some of Friedman’s reflections (1966): “Liberals conceive of 
man as an imperfect being. And they look upon the problem of social organisation as 
both a negative problem of preventing bad people from doing bad things and of 
allowing good people to do good. And of course, good people and bad people can be 
the same people, depending on who judges them. The basic problem of social 
organisation is how to coordinate the economic activities of a large number of people,” IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
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assuming that it is necessary to reconcile a natural interdependence with individual 
freedom. 
 
The risk of accepting as valid the set of recommendations that are being offered by a 
variety of institutions to promote social responsibility practices among companies is one 
of the greatest risks that society faces. From a viewpoint that is frank but superficial, 
certain rules of corporate conduct are being imposed upon us that go beyond what a 
sense of prudence and ethics recommends. These new pan-corporate enterprises, which 
seek to flood the whole field of social activity, are the most dangerous structures one 
can imagine. The process of establishing an excessively rule-bound life brings with it 
the obliteration of both individual and collective freedom. Turning the altruistic 
concerns and social commitment of the members of the organisation into “phagocytes”, 
channelling the manifestations of employee’s sensitivities towards causes that the 
company supports as an institution, can be an effective way of limiting their freewill.  
 
Governments, for their part, are busy pushing through laws that regulate these practices 
and, which at the same time, open up new options for consultancy firms, which have 
struck upon a rich new seam of work in the shape of companies’ new “triple bottom 
line” reporting requirements. With a remarkable lack of caution, firms are accepting 
without question one of the most effective currents of aggression they could face: that 
of questioning their activity, placing their mission under suspicion and dragging anti-
business activities out of them, that destroy such value, however great or small, as they 
might be creating. It is no coincidence that anti-globalisation groups and the most 
pugnacious NGOs are behind the institutions that are defending CSR most vehemently. 
Many of them must be rubbing their hands together in delight at firms’ passivity. 
 
We should not, however, overlook the fact that certain social actions might bring 
benefits to the company performing them. These benefits are often largely intangible, 
but quantifiable, and some companies unequivocally attribute benefits such as building 
a brand, improving their reputation, or improving the employment climate to their social 
practices. These practices produce benefits that have an impact on some organisations 
and not on others. They constitute a source of competitive advantage for those 
companies that have been able to exploit them. The moment that these social codes and 
practices are articulated in ordinary legislation, as Greenfield proposes, this ability to 
create value is automatically lost. 
 
Recent activities carried out by firms in fields that are traditionally a long way from 
their interests, such as those involved in Corporate Social Responsibility, may result in a 
rethink of their social mission. The fact that the company is concerned about, and makes 
the effort to channel, the ethical manifestations of employees and other stakeholder 
groups may be the start of a process of institutionalisation that ends up by undermining 
the scope for personal action by those with whom it relates. Is CSR subsidiary to 
personal ethics or should personal ethics be subsidiary to corporate responsibility? Can 
an individual leave in the hands of the institution the possibility of being responsible for 
the results of his or her actions and decisions? What comes first, the company or the 
person?   These are issues we will look at in more detail below. 
 
We have also observed that crucial, widely accepted assumptions have become a 
commonplace of CSR: 
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•  Forums are productive because they allow the “good” to be discovered 
democratically.  
 
•  CSR is always good, so everyone should practice it.  
 
Both statements are so commonplace that they have ended up being accepted without a 
prior reflection on their implications.  
 
INSTITUTIONS AND PEOPLE 
 
Man’s link to some form of institution has been a constant factor throughout history. It 
is as though he was not intended to travel alone and the support of others has always 
been essential in order for him to achieve his individual goals. Belonging to a reference 
group can help make people’s efforts effective, while providing the desirable 
reassurance of not being mistaken, even if it is only because there are others travelling 
along the same path. 
 
When an organisation sets itself up as being the legitimate repository of knowledge of 
what is good for others, other people come to consider it an institution, a reference to 
follow, a model to emulate in the exercise of a series of practices. This fact, which we 
can call “institutionalisation of people”, also happens when a company, in pursuing 
CSR, makes itself a focus of attention for all those who relate to it.  
 
The “institutionalised” man 
 
In the case of a corporation, institutionalisation brings with it a series of dangers. These 
include the usurpation of personal ethics, leading a rule-based life, and in short, the loss 
of authenticity and spontaneity. One characteristic of all institutionalised forms is that 
they have their own culture: their symbols, their terminology, and their conceptual 
schemes. The practices of CSR have become a fundamental component of the culture 
defining the corporate essence of each institution, as they make explicit the way in 
which the institution understands its mission and its commitments to and with the 
community in which it operates. It is true that in order to “economise”, to save time and 
avoid the need to rethink over and over again, we tend to set out from a series of 
fundamental principles we take to be valid and unquestioned. People tend to assume 
certain “conventions” closely linked to the styles current in the institution to which they 
belong, and which arise from other people’s accumulated experience and are formulated 
as principles. Formulating them in this way results in simplifications. They become the 
distilled essence of prior praxis, decanted in a continual exercise of synthesis. These 
practices are incorporated into the cultural heritage a group of people shares, 
conditioning the way they act, see reality and even how they interpret themselves. These 
principles come to form the base on which the feelings of the members of this “cultural 
community” rest.  
 
When the principles that govern life within this institution are no more than a set of 
general concepts, they open up many possible paths for individuals to follow, allowing 
them not only to interpret their applicability and validity in each case, in each life 
situation, but also to contribute by creating new formulations. However, when these 
principles are carved in stone, they end up turning into a burden, and rather than serving 
as an aid, oppress people, as they allow little scope for personal initiative to adapt them IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
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to concrete and real situations. It is not unusual that in an atmosphere like this 
individuals should tend to belittle all that is unique about them and magnify those 
aspects that define them as members of the group who are uniform with the rest. And 
after committing this violence against themselves again and again, they will give up on 
the task of forging their personality, thus fracturing their authenticity. 
 
The members of the institution end up playing a role defined by the demands of the 
institution. Like good actors they need to avoid their personality showing through in 
their performance. What is important –“the good”– is that the character assigned to 
them –the same for all– is presented before the others in the purest form possible, 
without the actor’s degrading his role by letting his own personality show through. The 
“member” is expect to mimic the model provided, negating himself so the character can 
shine. This leads to a kind of “biographical dictatorship” that imposes a permanent 
curfew on the individual’s most authentic feelings and thoughts. 
 
SO, WHY PROMOTE CSR? 
 
Does it make sense to promote CSR in our companies? What real benefits does it bring? 
The firm is not doing any more than it used to: the social audits reflect the same things 
that were being done before, but presented in a different way. Intensive training 
schemes are nothing new. Nor is the idea of offering packages with social benefits. 
Simón, Martínez and Agüero (2005) show how, for years, firms have been promoting 
corporate voluntary work and have been concerned with the reliability of suppliers, to 
give just two examples. So what does CSR bring with it? In fact, in many cases it has 
nothing to offer. The company was already socially responsible, although it did not say 
so expressly. Its social responsibility was only apparent through employee satisfaction, 
its standing in society, the loyalty of its customers, the commercial success of the 
business. It is not that the company wants to cheat us with these new and artificial 
reports. It just tells us about what it has been doing all along in a new way to suit our 
tastes. It is an aesthetic rather than an ethical question.  
 
For some people, CSR is how firms can contribute to achieving a better society and a 
cleaner environment. They therefore integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their commercial operations and their relationships with their stakeholder groups. What 
underlies these good intentions is the belief that business activity does not contribute to 
society and the environment but destroys it. They consider it a lesser evil, and so aim to 
divert outside attention away from business activity. If this is so one should ask whether 
the firm is responsible for all the ills of mankind. Is there a “butterfly effect” in firms’ 
actions? But also, CSR, as everyone understands it, rules out the presumption of 
innocence from the start. Companies are charged with demonstrating that they are clean 
and have to meet the costs of responding to accusations from groups who have been 
socially legitimated by organisations whose interests are often obscure. This implies we 
are witnessing a phase of business persecution. Production is in itself bad. To counter 
this current, the firm has once again to take up the task of explicitly stating what it 
really does, without being ashamed of its essential nature. Those measures intended to 
disguise in some way its true function will sooner or later have a negative impact on the 
company by submerging it in an environment in which it does not belong. Friedman 
(1966) was aware of these risks when he said that: “If businessmen have a social 
responsibility other than obtaining maximum returns for shareholders, how are they to 
know what it is? Can a few self-appointed individuals decide what is in the social IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
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interest?” While CSR is not aimed at facilitating what is considered the principal 
mission of the firm – to generate profits by creating value – it will be relegated to a 
secondary, and at times artificial, position.  
 
However, we cannot simply condemn CSR, despite what might appear to be convincing 
arguments in the preceding paragraphs. Assuming there is a danger of falling into 
particularism, lack of focus and inconsistencies for defending causes unrelated to the 
business. The first step that needs to be taken would not be to “require reasonable 
analyses and good answers from those who purport to know what is right or good for 
the rest of us”, as Greenfield concludes, but to remind these illuminati that their role is 
secondary, consultative, because the real protagonist of business action is the business 
man or woman. 
 
CSR not only groups together codes and standards of all types, it also encompasses a 
variety of social actions undertaken by companies. As Prahalad (2004) says, in 
numerous instances, business social action has brought about a tangible and quantifiable 
improvement in the community. This implies that if the company in question had not 
carried out these actions in the community these improvements would not have been 
achieved, at least not on the same timescale. Nevertheless, CSR has appropriated these 
actions as they improve people’s lives and the environment, due to an insulting effort to 
delimit good business conduct.  
 
If the company makes a donation to charity, for example, it is making it harder for its 
stakeholders to decide for themselves what use to make of their funds. The nexus of 
union between the stakeholders and the company is the latter’s business activity. That is 
what makes them stakeholders. Each of them may, and indeed should, have their own 
social goals, and it is not the company’s place to impose a particular direction upon 
them as to how they express their altruistic preferences. This point leads us to argue in 
favour of the inclusion of social action practices as an integral part of the company’s 
strategy. As Austin (2004) states, there are numerous examples of CSR actions that 
have brought value, have helped the company perform more efficiently, and have 
improved its relations.  Therefore, only insofar as social action contributes to achieving 
business goals and makes the company more attractive to stakeholder groups, CSR will 
have the impact we have never denied it has. Otherwise it will be a tool of ethical 
monopoly. 
 
WHEN IS CSR APPROPRIATE? 
 
In our view, the CSR should be treated in the same way as financial information. 
Nobody forces a company to list itself on the stock market, but if it does (normally in 
order to access capital markets, with all the benefits that that brings), it must be 
transparent about how it uses its resources. Similarly, it is not essential for a company to 
undertake social action. However, if it does, it should be committed to providing 
truthful and useful information so that stakeholders can freely make up their mind about 
the extent to which they want to be involved with the company. 
 
CSR will be understood and assumed differently according to the degree of maturity of 
the company to take on the commitment this kind of action requires. To determine this 
degree of maturity, Martínez, Simón and Agüero (2003) recommend that companies 
reflect on the pros and cons of CSR. To facilitate this analysis they have identified three IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
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drivers or catalysts of social action in companies:  
 
•  The degree of competition in the sector 
 
•  The strength of the corporate values 
 
•  The degree of sensitivity to social problems. 
 
 
These drivers serve as indicators to management enabling them to diagnose its situation. 
Will these practices be sustainable over time? How will they impact the company’s 
strategy? Do they arise out of a serious commitment or need on the part of the 
company? Every company has to make an effort to get to know itself and know if it is in 
a position to implement CSR or if it should take preliminary steps. It will be positioned 
on the “map” reproduced below depending on the score it obtains after analysing each 
of the cited parameters. 
 
 
DEGREE OF COMPETITION 
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DEGREE OF SOCIAL SENSITIVITY 
 
  
Source: “La Acción Social de la Empresa: el caso español y latinoamericano”. 
 
The authors identify eight scenarios describing positions in which a company may find 
itself. They say that it is only possible to determine with certainty the two scenarios in 
which the generation of value by means of social action can be determined in advance: 
the first, scenario 5 (highlighted in red), where the authors recommend waiting and not 
initiating any social action due to the low score obtained on all the drivers. If there is 
not a high degree of competition in the sector, society is not sensitised and, moreover, 
the company does not have a bedrock of corporate values, what is the use of 
implementing a CSR plan? The second scenario, scenario 4 (highlighted in green), in 
which the factors identified as generating value are entirely favourable, reveals an 
opportunity for the company. In a highly competitive sector, where society is highly 
sensitised and the company has a personality comprising a solid bedrock of corporate 
values, it is an opportunity to stand out from the crowd. In this case the authors’ 
recommendation is to implement a social responsibility plan without delay: the 




In the case of the six remaining scenarios (1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8), the company would have 
to aim for a balance between the three factors to ensure success. Only by carrying out an 
in-depth internal and external analysis of the company will it be possible to determine 
its position in the framework above. The diagnosis will arrive at a conclusion on 
whether or not the company should initiate or continue with a CSR plan, or if, on the 
other hand, it should give up one it has started.  
 
HOW SHOULD A FIRM GO ABOUT CSR? 
 
The fundamental pillar is voluntary action focusing on the business objective so as to 
generate quantifiable returns for the company. Husted and Allen (2000), have identified 
the following basic characteristics as being the necessary conditions to avoid CSR’s 
having a perverse effect. 
 
It should be undertaken voluntarily 
 
This is obvious, but is frequently forgotten.  If it is not voluntary, it is not free; and what 
is not done freely, is outside the scope of ethics. Martínez (2002) says that “if people 
are obligated to give help, if they are mobilised by an appeal to their feelings of 
compassion and perhaps guilt, the results of the actions may well be the same as if it 
were performed voluntarily, but all personal responsibility will vanish”. We agree with 
Weltzein, H. von (2003) that self-regulation is the best mechanism of control: “Social 
responsibility starts where the laws leave off (...) To be socially responsible means not 
only fully complying with legal obligations, but going beyond compliance by investing 
more in human capital, the environment, and relations with stakeholders. If, by 
definition, CSR means going beyond legal obligations, how can CSR be turned into 
regulations? This apparent contradiction is not just an indicator of how diffuse this 
area is, but also reflects the perspective of those who perceive that the principles 
relating to CSR are the start of a genuinely fundamental shift towards future legislation 
on CSR.” 
 
It should be proactive 
 
We can wait for NGOs and other groups to give us their suggestions. But although less 
frequent it is more effective to look for those areas of activity that are best aligned with 
the brand the company represents. This means devoting time and resources to doing 
work whose outcome would be obtained over long time horizons, and there will be 
members of the organisation that reasonably think this diverts resources that could give 
a more immediate and more viable return.  
 
However, not all causes are the same. They are not all attractive to companies and not 
all potential partners are able to do things well and show results. Strategic alliances with 
organisations close to the social problems in question reduces the risks involved and 
makes actions more effective (Austin, 2000). What the company has to do is know what 
to look for. It can leave the actual doing to others. IE Working Paper                                    WP05-04                                17 - 01 - 2005 
 
  11
It needs to be aligned with the company’s strategy 
 
It must be designed, executed and evaluated in line with strategic criteria, following the 
same guidelines as for any other vital interests of the company. It must also be 
integrated with the organisation’s mission. It should not be a sham, or a set of tasks that 
diverts the organisation away from its core business activities. Rather it should reinforce 
and catalyse them. It should therefore respect the criterion of centrality that measures 
the degree to which the cause being supported matches and harmonises with the 
company’s activities, products and services. 
 
It should be visible 
 
Customers, shareholders and employees are entitled to know about the activities of the 
company they are buying their products from, in which they invest their money, and for 
which they work. Very often it is said that the right thing to do in these ethical matters is 
to apply the maxim “don’t let your right hand see what your left hand is doing”, 
highlighting that the good has to be sought after for the attractiveness of the good itself. 
Intentions are important and it is obvious that the good that is generated indirectly to 
satisfy particular needs from the moral point of view is less good (so to speak) than that 
which is pursued out of conviction, that the instrumentalisation of ethics is a bad thing. 
But this obsession with keeping a low profile is applicable to people, not to 
organisations, as these are a means to an end. Of themselves, they are artefacts or tools, 
and they can be good or bad only insofar as they fulfil effectively and efficiently the 
purpose for which they were created. Communication of what they do in terms of social 
action is as important as financial transparency in the stock market. It is essential in 
order to allow the investor to make free and rational decisions.  





This article has sought to argue that companies cannot be forced to follow CSR 
practices. CSR only makes sense when it emerges at the free initiative of the company 
and the latter can use it to improve itself. To do otherwise, as Friedman has pointed out 
(1970), would be to “abandon our model of a free society and move towards the 
corporate state.”  
 
CSR aims to go beyond the scope of private activity to convert doing (communicating) 
something for the public into a public service, which is different. This has meant that 
CSR has found strong defenders and detractors who deny everything to do with the 
social nature of the firm. In our view, the error lies in raising corporate social action to 
the level of public policy, not in doing it. It is one thing to be a social actor, in the sense 
of performing an action, and another to be an actor acting a role. We clearly would not 
wish to question that the company go beyond the walls of the factory. What we do 
consider doubtful is that there is just one recommendable and regulatable way for it to 
do so. 
 
Fortunately we believe that common sense will eventually be restored in day-to-day 
practice and that businesses will continue to be run the way they see fit. Social actions, 
speeches and balance sheets may be necessary because everyone does them and the 
resources will need to be found, as far as is possible. But I do not know many business 
people willing to provide funds for particular activities indefinitely for the sole reason 
that external agents feel they should, unless of course, they are legally required to do so. 
 
Mixing strange adjectives and flourishes with business will do nothing but bore the 
public. Fortunately, the public thinks for itself and prefers to make up its own mind 
about how responsible any individual or company is, rather than sitting down and being 
lectured to about how committed the company is. Speeches tire, or rather bore, and tend 
to water down any advantage there might initially have been. 
 
It would bring much health to the company to extricate itself from miscellaneous 
forums and meetings where it is invited to contemplate what others want it to be rather 
than contribute to fully leveraging its value-generating potential. We will also pat 
ourselves on the back for those organisations that voluntarily undertake social action, 
but we will recommend that if they do, it is to be hoped that they do it well. We already 
have enough experience to know what works and what does not. 
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